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ARTICLE
Richard Zitrin
Regulating the Behavior of Lawyers in Mass Individual
Representations: A Call for Reform
Abstract. Cases in which lawyers represent large numbers of individual
plaintiffs are increasingly common. While these cases have some of the
indicia of class actions, they are not class actions, usually because there are
no common damages, but rather individual representations on a mass
scale. Current ethics rules do not provide adequate guidance for even the
most ethical lawyers. The absence of sufficiently flexible, practical ethical
rules has become an open invitation for less-ethical attorneys to abuse,
often severely, the mass-representation framework by abrogating individual
clients' rights. These problems can be abated if the ethics rules offered
better practical solutions to the mass-representation problem. It is
necessary to reform the current rules, but only with a solution that is both
practical and attainable, and with changes that maintain the core ethical
and fiduciary duties owed by lawyers to their individual clients, including
loyalty, candor, and independent professional advice.
Author. Lecturer in Law, University of California Hastings College of
the Law; founder and former director of the Center for Applied Legal
Ethics at the University of San Francisco School of Law; and a fulltime
practicing lawyer, now Of Counsel to Carlson, Calladine & Peterson, LLP,
San Francisco. This Article is similar to Chapter 4, Problem 11, of Legal
Ethics in the Practice of Law, of which I am the author of the relevant text.
Similar commentary will appear in two of my American Law Media
"Moral Compass" columns. I am most indebted to my (new) colleague
Morris Ratner, who shared his perspective about mass-plaintiff cases, and
to Professor Nancy Moore, who has long written so thoughtfully on this
issue from an ethics perspective.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this Article is to examine some significant practical problems
inherent in representation of large numbers of individual clients en masse
and to recommend alternative, albeit preliminary, solutions. In addressing
this issue, I am informed primarily by my own and others' involvement in
litigating ethical issues arising out of what I will term, for want of a better
phrase, "mass-plaintiff cases," and circumstances I witnessed in which
individual clients' rights were shunted aside in the interests of expediency,
lawyer arrogance and control, and simple avarice. Even for honest lawyers
who are simply trying to fit the round peg of multiple representations into
the square and rigid hole of the applicable ethics rules,1 especially Rule
1.8 (g) of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct,2 the task proves virtually impossible.
I confess at the outset, in light of the burgeoning explosion of such cases
and the disconnect between what attorneys are allowed to do and what
they actually do, I am far more interested in practical solutions to these
issues (especially those that protect the needs of individual clients who are
often improperly treated like passive class members or worse) than in an
analysis of the theoretical constructs or philosophies underlying these
issues. Thus, this Article focuses on the practical realities of these cases,
particularly that these are individual representations, no matter how many
in number. While plaintiffs' lawyers sometimes litigate these cases as if
they are class actions, those who treat individual plaintiffs like passive class
members are violating their duties to their clients.
I believe it is obvious rule reform is necessary. Unfortunately, today
plaintiffs' lawyers who undertake mass representations are often
emboldened to marginalize essential ethics rules regarding conflicts of
interest, the duty of candid disclosure, and the rights of clients to control
their own case destiny. These attorneys are able to do this because, given
the complexities of such litigation, they are rarely caught. This is a
problem that both the rules-makers and disciplinary authorities must
tackle head-on.
Significantly, in addressing these issues and proposed reforms, I have
intentionally not distinguished between groups of unorganized individual
1. See Charles Silver, Merging Roles: Mass Tort Lawyers As Agents and Trustees, 31 PEPP. L. REV.
301, 303 (2003) (describing the predicament lawyers encounter in mass tort cases as "[florcing square
pegs into round holes").
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2012) (allowing aggregate settlements
of claims involving two or more clients only when "each client gives informed consent, in a writing
signed by the client").
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cases and cases grouped together collectively either by statute, judicial
fiat,' or both. To me, the hallmark of all these cases, whether grouped
together or not and whether involving one lawyer, a law firm, or dozens of
firms, is that they are all individual representations. From the perspective
of legal ethics, each lawyer owes each client a full panoply of fiduciary
duties, including the duty of loyalty, regardless of the venue.'
Finally, I recognize there is a tendency in literature to focus on federal
law.6 Mass representations, however, frequently occur in state court cases,
where the regulatory schemes for joint litigation are often less sophisticated
than the federal statutes and are sometimes virtually non-existent.
II. MASS INDIVIDUAL CASES ARE NOT CLASS ACTIONS
What happens when lawyers find themselves with cases that look like
class actions, with numerous individual plaintiffs, but are not eligible for
class action treatment, usually because each case is unique on its facts or
has unique damages? Mass cases-typically tort claims such as allegations
about toxic pollution or defective drugs-have become more and more
common,7  but the ethical rules that govern them remain the same.
Specifically, despite multiple parties with similar complaints, these cases
are individual representations, not group representations or class actions,
and the same ethical rules that apply to lawyers who represent two clients
will apply equally to lawyers representing hundreds.8
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012) (describing the process of consolidating "actions involving one
or more common questions of fact"); TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 11.1, reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. F app. (West 2005) (allowing the grouping of cases for joint litigation treatment).
4. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(illustrating a federal judge taking control of litigation under Section 1407 and describing the case as
a "quasi-class action").
5. While much work has been done evaluating and analyzing institutionally grouped cases,
particularly in law review articles and journals focused on mass torts, little of this work has centered
on a legal ethics perspective. See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Choice of Law for Professional Responsibility
Issues in Aggregate Litigation, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73, 95 (2009) (lamenting professional
responsibility issues are so seldom the focus of analysis).
6. Cf Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment ofAdequacy in
Litigation and Settlement Classes, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687, 1743 (2004) ("In addition, analysis and
discussion of class action litigation obsessively focuses on federal class actions, slighting any analysis of
state class action litigation.").
7. See Douglas G. Smith, Resolution of Mass Tort Claims in the Bankruptcy System, 41 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 1613, 1615 (2008) ("Mass tort litigation in the United States has expanded rapidly in
the last few decades.").
8. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2012) (delineating and explaining
conflicts of interest and the duty of loyalty); id. R. 1.8(g) (prohibiting the aggregate settlement of
claims when representing two or more clients in the same action); see also Tax Authority, Inc. v.
Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 514 (N.J. 2006) (applying the New Jersey statute modeled after
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Take, for example, a toxic tort case: A large number of people on one
side of town sue for damages, alleging a local company deposited toxic
waste into the town's groundwater. Given the scientific sophistication of
such cases and the specialized area of law, it would be almost impossible
for each individual plaintiff to find a separate lawyer. Further, plaintiffs
without serious symptoms or prognoses might not be able to find lawyers
at all.
As a result, it makes sense for plaintiffs to band together in a single
lawsuit. Even if they do not join together, their suits may eventually
become consolidated before one court for the sake of judicial economy,
where they are generally termed multi-district litigations, or MDLs.9 But
each plaintiffs circumstances may remain different in a number of ways,
from how close to the "plume" of toxicity the plaintiff lives to the severity
of damages suffered. Damages alone may range from the sniffles or a rash
to cancer; with such disparate damages come disparate proof problems, as
well as ineligibility for class action treatment.
In class actions, lawyers represent the class itself through its class
representatives, commonly known as named plaintiffs.'o Cases frequently
settle without individual class members' approval and-subject to court
approval-may settle without the class representatives' approval.'
However, because mass tort cases involve large numbers of individual
lawsuits, lawyers cannot escape the fact that they represent individual
clients, no matter how many there are. As with any individual client, each
individual has the autonomous right to settle, the right to have his lawyer
negotiate the best possible resolution for the individual or to go to trial,
and the right to have the lawyer give her considered advice about what is
Rule 1.8 (g) to a case with 154 individual plaintiffs).
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012) (governing MDLs in federal courts); TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN.
11.1 (recognizing ways to try cases with common facts together); see also Yvette Ostolaza & Michelle
Hartmann, Overview ofMultidistrict Litigation Rules at the State and Federal Level, 26 REV. LITIG. 47,
55 (2007) (noting MDL panels consider whether consolidation would "lead to a just and efficient
resolution of the dispute" before transferring cases).
10. For the rules regarding federal litigation, see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ("One or more members
of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members [if certain conditions
are met]."). See also Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137,
1145 (2009) ("The class action bundles together the claims of similarly situated claimants, and
nominates a class representative and class counsel to prosecute these claims on each claimant's
behalf"). Note that at the time a class is certified, the court appoints counsel to represent the class
directly. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(1)(B).
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e); see Alexandra N. Rothman, Note, Bringing an End to the Trend
Cutting Judicial "Approval" and "Rejection" Out of Non-Class Mass Settlement, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
319, 329 (2011) (observing class action settlements may be binding against class members who have
not individually approved the settlement).
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best for that particular individual.12
But if a lawyer or group of lawyers represents 300 individual plaintiffs,
or 1,000, or 9,000, how can they possibly do their best job for each, fulfill
their fiduciary duties to each, and advise each on what is best for that
particular person without compromising their representation of everyone
else? The answer is "with great difficulty."
III. PRACTICAL REALITIES AND PRACTICAL QUESTIONS
Some practical realities routinely occur in mass-plaintiff representation
that substantially impact ethical lawyering:
First, defendants like to settle claims by buying global peace, which
means that if all or the vast majority of plaintiffs do not settle, a defendant
will simply take the offer off the table. 13
Second, defendants are not in the business of partitioning their
settlements. They typically offer a lump sum and leave the division to
plaintiffs' counsel. Thus, groups of cases are commonly settled together-
almost always in MDLs and cases consolidated before one judge, and often
in single-lawyer, multiple-plaintiff cases-for one aggregate sum.' 4
Third, some plaintiffs or groups of plaintiffs inevitably have higher
damages and are more likely to succeed at trial and get high settlement
values when compared with others. Plaintiffs are likely to be placed in
different categories depending on things such as the location in the plume
of toxicity or the degree of exposure to defective drugs, the severity of harm
12. The rules explicitly require clients receive considered advice and that the decision whether
to settle, having first received that advice, resides with the client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.4 (a) (2012) (requiring a lawyer to "reasonably consult with the client about the
means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished"); id. R. 1.2(a) ("[A] lawyer shall abide
by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . ."). The comment to Rule 1.2
declares in part, "The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter,
must also be made by the client." Id. R. 1.2 cmt. 1.
13. See Matthew L. Garretson, A Practical Approach to Avoiding Aggregate Settlement Conflicts,
THE SETITLEMENT SERvICES GROUP, at 2 (2004), http://www.settlementplan.com/pdf/
aggregate-settlements.pdf (noting that before agreeing to settle, defendants often demand that most
of the plaintiffs participate in the settlement); cf Georgene Vairo, Mass Tort Bankruptcies: The Who,
the Why and the How, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 93, 95 (2004) (observing defendants in asbestos litigation
routinely "use the bankruptcy laws to obtain global peace" when rules or case law makes it difficult
for them to do so otherwise).
14. See Howard M. Erichson, A Typology ofAggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1769, 1784-86 (2005) (analyzing various forms of aggregate settlements in an attempt to better
define them); Matthew L. Garretson, A Practical Approach to Avoiding Aggregate Settlement Conflicts,
THE SETTLEMENT SERVICES GROUP, at .8 (2004), http://www.settlementplan.com/pdfl
aggregate settlements.pdf (describing options plaintiffs' lawyers have in allocating a lump sum
settlement).
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or illness suffered, and the likelihood of being able to prove the toxicity or
harmful drugs caused the harm.
Fourth, if the cases do not settle and thus go to trial, it is common for
both sides to choose some exemplar or "bellwether" cases to try or arbitrate
first.' 5  These are representative cases used to help define a global
settlement after a reasonable sampling of trials.' 6
These realities create a plethora of pitfalls for even the most ethical
lawyer, and for every pitfall, there are serious questions that must be
addressed. The disparate hierarchy of case values puts counsel in a dicey
position when advising plaintiffs whose claims seem to be de minimis when
compared to those with claims that are more serious or provable.' 7 How
can counsel be loyal to Plaintiff 1, Plaintiff 300, and every plaintiff in
between if she suggests more money go to one person than another?
Further, how can counsel represent Plaintiff 72 who has more of a
causation and proof problem than Plaintiff 264?
Even more troubling may be what happens when the defendant makes a
substantial offer to settle, but only if 90% of the plaintiffs agree. If an
insufficient number of plaintiffs decide to settle, may the lawyer try to
persuade the minority to climb on board because the settlement offer is
good for the vast majority of plaintiffs? How can she when she must
advise those few only according to what is right for them, which might be
not to settle because the deal is not beneficial for them personally? Is it
ever possible to give a true, honest opinion to all clients in these
circumstances without the whole deal cratering? If not, who gets the
attorney's best advice and who loses out?
If trial becomes necessary, how does the plaintiffs lawyer choose her
representative cases for the bellwether trial? Those cases may involve
15. In bellwether cases a random sample of cases are tried to a jury or arbitrator, and the parties
use the result to determine damages as to all of the cases or as a bargaining chip at arbitration.
Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 577-78 (2008).
16. See id. ("Judges currently use bellwether trials informally in mass tort litigation to assist in
valuing cases and to encourage settlement."); see also Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in
Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TuL. L. REV. 2323, 2332 (2008) (noting that under the modern
approach, bellwether trials are designed "to provide meaningful information and experience to
everyone involved in the litigations").
17. See Nancy J. Moore, The Absence of Legal Ethics in the ALI's Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation: A Missed Opportunity-and More, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 717, 730 (2011)
(touching on the risk in aggregate litigation of conflicts of interest between clients due to "varying
degrees of injury or different statutes of limitations"); cf Blecher & Collins, P.C. v. Nw. Airlines,
Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1442, 1446-48 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (exemplifying the difficulty of pursuing a
unified claim when the damages of each individual airline plaintiff were so different that they proved
to be impossible to pursue any way but separately).
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greater rewards, but the plaintiffs face an all-or-nothing risk.
Today, conflicts of interest are common, and waivers of those conflicts
are almost as common.'s But what does a conflict of interest waiver look
like in a case like this? Is it even possible to construct a waiver that
protects the individual rights of 300 plaintiffs and provides informed
consent?
Just as significantly, how can lawyers avoid the conflicts of interest that
face them personally? Cases such as mass toxic tort or defective drug
claims are often extremely expensive to litigate and frequently remain
problematic as to proof.' 9 Rewards are high, but so are the risks. After
investing millions, it is understandable that a lawyer may take sides on
whether to settle, favoring big-damages clients over small, and may be
tempted to take short cuts around the ethics rules.2 0
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Current ethics rules and case law offer little guidance for lawyers faced
with the problems discussed above, even when those attorneys strive to be
ethical. For instance, every jurisdiction in the country has a rule stating
that only the client may decide whether to settle. 2 1 The case law
addressing this issue generally considers this an unwaivable right.2 2
Moreover, the American Bar Association's Model Rule 1.8(g) states that
a "lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in
making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients."2 3
18. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.8 (2012) (discussing conflicts of
interest with current clients and describing the requirements of informed consent when waiving
rights such as conflicts of interest).
19. See Howard M. Erichson, Uncertainty and the Advantage of Collective Settlement, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 633 (2011) ("Indeed, if one surveys the major mass torts-asbestos, tobacco,
fen-phen, and so on-it is difficult to find any in which individual causation does not loom large.").
20. See Charles Silver, Ethics and Innovation, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754, 755 (2011)
(discussing ethical issues that arise when the attorney invests in the litigation and becomes an agent or
joint-venturer).
21. See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.02(a)(2), reprinted in TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2005) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9) (setting
forth the Texas rule, which states "a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions ... whether to accept an
offer of settlement of a matter"). See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)
(2012) (requiring attorneys to provide their clients with considered advice); id. R. 1.2(a) (providing
the client with the ultimate right to accept or reject a settlement offer).
22. See Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 513 F.2d 892, 894 (10th Cir. 1985) ("An agreement
such as the present one[,] which allows a case to be settled contrary to the wishes of the client and
without his approving the terms of the settlement[,] is opposed to the basic fundamentals of the
attorney-client relationship."); Tax Authority, Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 522 (N.J.
2006) (holding a client cannot consent to a settlement prior to learning the terms of the agreement).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (g) (2012). Professor Howard M. Erichson
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Avoiding the prohibited aggregate settlement means, simply, that when
groups of cases are settled for a lump sum, each individual client must
approve of the specific settlement after being adequately informed by that
client's lawyer.2 4  These two closely-related concepts-the client's absolute
right to control settlement and the lawyer's inability to accept an aggregate
settlement-make it difficult for plaintiffs' lawyers to ethically and
efficiently represent hundreds of clients; they cannot represent their clients
by majority rule, super-majority rule, electing a litigation steering
committee, or any other mechanism that might seem to make intuitive
sense.2 5
In Tax Authority, Inc. v. Jackson-Hewitt, Inc.,2 the court held that Rule
1.8 (g) does not allow an attorney to bind his clients to a settlement
supported by a weighted majority of the plaintiffs.2 Prior to litigation,
154 plaintiffs agreed in the initial retainer agreement to be bound to a
settlement agreement approved by a majority vote.2  When a settlement
agreement was proposed, several plaintiffs objected to the settlement, but
on appeal, only a single client sought to obviate the initial retainer contract
correctly notes that the ABA Model Rules, its predecessor, the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
"leaves 'aggregate settlement' undefined. The rule prohibits aggregate settlements in the absence of
certain disclosures and client consent, but it never states what constitutes an aggregate settlement."
Howard M. Erichson, A Typologv ofAggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769, 1782
(2005),
24. Professor Erichson is in basic agreement with this simple definition: "If the amounts are
negotiated individually for each plaintiff, and if the settlements are not conditioned on others'
acceptance, then the deal ordinarily should be considered non-aggregate.... Sometimes, a bundle of
individual settlements is simply a bundle of individual settlements." Howard M. Erichson, A
Typolog of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1769, 1806 (2005). That is, if each
settlement carries with it that client's informed consent, it is individually approved and not
aggregate.
25. See Nancy J. Moore, The Case Against Changing the Aggregate Settlement Rule in Mass Tort
Lawsuits, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 149, 165 (1999) ("As interpreted by courts, however, the aggregate
settlement rule forbids lawyers from entering settlement over the objection of any plaintiff, even
when that plaintiff has agreed in advance to be bound by a vote of a majority or a supermajority.");
see also Nancy J. Moore, The Absence of Legal Ethics in the AL's Principles of the Law of Aggregate
Litigation: A Missed Opportuniynd More, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 717, 718 (2011) (discussing a
proposed change to the Model Rules that would allow claimants to "agree in advance, under certain
circumstances, to be bound by a majority vote in favor of a particular settlement"). But see AM. LAW
INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.17 (2010) (proscribing the
requirements for using informed consent to allow multiple clients to use a substantial majority vote to
accept aggregate settlements).
26. Tax Authority, Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512 (N.J. 2006).
27. Id. at 514-15.
28. Id. at 514.
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and thus to not be bound by the settlement.2 In refusing to enforce the
agreement to settle in the attorney-client contract, the appellate court
reasoned, "The critical provision of the [rule] is that the client consent to
the final settlement. Even assuming sufficient disclosure in this case, the
fact remains that the . . . settlement mechanism . . . permitted settlement
without consent as to those in the minority."3 0  The court then
concluded, "While it is indeed regrettable that one of 154 plaintiffs may
possibly upset a settlement as to which all others have now agreed, we see
no principled basis upon which to require [the one client] to settle when it
"131does not wish to do so ....
The Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed, writing, "Simply stated,
[Rule] 1.8 (g) imposes two requirements on lawyers representing multiple
clients. The first is that the terms of the settlement must be disclosed to
each client. The second is that after the terms of the settlement are
known, each client must agree to the settlement. "32
This case is hardly an outlier, but rather is in accord with a large body of
cases, including the Tenth Circuit's Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.3 3
In In re Hoffman,3 4  the Louisiana Supreme Court insisted that
"[u]nanimous informed consent by the lawyer's clients is required before
an aggregate settlement may be finalized. The requirement of informed
"135consent cannot be avoided by obtaining client consent in advance ....
Significantly, this means that the right to settle is not waivable by the
client-or put another way, if waived, the waiver is fully revocable. The
bottom line is the same: only the client gets to decide.
29. Id. at 516-17.
30. Tax Authority, Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 873 A.2d 616, 624-25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2005).
31. Id. at 630. Further, the court rebuked the attorney for representing all of the clients and
stated that the attorney "should have withdrawn as counsel for all plaintiffs since his position favoring
settlement had placed him in an adverse relationship to some of his former clients," to wit, the
minority who opposed the settlement. Id. at 621 n.4 .
32. Tax Authority, 898 A.2d at 522 (N.J. 2006). Despite agreeing with the lower court, the
Supreme Court decided to enforce the agreement and only apply the rule against majority approval
prospectively. Id.
33. Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 513 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1985); see also supra note 18
(discussing the court's ruling that the client's right to settle is unwaivable). In Hayes, the court held
an advance agreement to accept a settlement offer based on majority rule is not in line with Rule
1.8 (g). Hayes, 513 F.2d at 894-95; accord Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d
1046, 1048 (D. Colo. 1999) (allowing defendant's counsel to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel on conflict
of interest grounds because his clients signed an informed consent in advance, creating a steering
committee and the use of majority votes to direct the litigation).
34. In re Hoffman, 883 So. 2d 425 (La. 2004).
35. Id. at 433 (internal citation omitted).
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American Bar Association Formal Opinion 06-438, published on
February 10, 2006, reaffirmed that Model Rule 1.2(a) "protects a client's
right in all circumstances to have the final say in deciding whether to
accept or reject an offer of settlement."- 6  Further, the opinion stated,
"Rule 1.8(g) deters lawyers from favoring one client over another in
settlement negotiations by requiring that lawyers reveal to all clients
information relevant to the proposed settlement." 3 7  Thus, each client
must be told:
[T]he total amount or result of the settlement or agreement, the amount and
nature of every client's participation in the settlement or agreement, the fees
and costs to be paid to the lawyer from the proceeds or by an opposing party
or parties, and the method by which the costs are to be apportioned to each
client.3 8
Other sources, including a 2009 New York City ethics opinion, are in
accord.3
However, the ABA opinion and most cases explicitly fail to state that a
lawyer in these circumstances has an independent fiduciary duty to give
each client the best possible advice about how to handle his or her case.
This duty goes well beyond merely disclosing the facts about settlement or
ensuring the client's right to settle. While giving this independent advice
may seem obvious, it is the ultimate test of loyalty, and courts often do not
explicitly discuss it in cases or opinions. Does this omission mean that case
law and the ABA opinion find this loyalty less important? Or is it simply
assumed or, worse, ignored? While it is speculation, the answer may rest
on the virtual impossibility of having a single lawyer or law firm
simultaneously give the best possible advice to hundreds of plaintiffs
individually. Although full disclosure is a cornerstone of the fiduciary
duties owed by lawyers to their clients, here its use may be almost
euphemistic in order to avoid tackling the far more difficult issue of a
36. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-438 (2006).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof I and Judicial Ethics, Formal
Op. 2009-6 (2009) (requiring an attorney to obtain informed written consent from every client
involved in an aggregate settlement before the trial conclusion); see also Nancy J. Moore, The Absence
of Legal Ethics in the ALls Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation: A Missed Opportunity-and
More, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 717, 731 (2011) (explaining under rules of professional conduct, a
lawyer must inform his clients of duties to other clients that might affect their representation);
Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rul, 32 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 733, 763 (1997) ("The aggregate settlement rule requires a lawyer to provide certain
information to each client before obtaining each client's consent.").
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lawyer advising each client while truly being in his or her client's corner-
thus, in 300 different corners at once.40
V. DO THE CURRENT RULES FOSTER Toxic LAWYERING?
All this sets a very high bar for lawyers negotiating their way through
mass-plaintiff cases. Perhaps because the rules and cases provide so little
flexibility, and because of the disconnect between those rules and the
realities of mass-plaintiff practice, there are many examples of lawyers
cutting corners, ignoring client rights, and even getting disbarred and
going to jail by playing fast and loose with mass-plaintiff cases.
A. Fen-Phen and Nexte!LMB
One example is the fen-phen cases. 41 In Kentucky, lawyers William
Gallion and Shirley Cunningham were disbarred and then jailed for
abusing their clients' trust in distributing $200 million in fen-phen
aggregate settlements.4 2  The special judge appointed over the case stated
that the lawyers passed out settlement funds "like it was theirs to do with
as they wish,"4 3 including $106 million allotted for attorneys' fees. 44  All
four attorneys involved were eventually disbarred, along with the judge
first assigned to the case.45 Noted third party "neutral" Kenneth Feinberg,
who initially approved the settlement, had to disown his own fairness
opinion.4
40. Similarly, the individual client is entitled to the lawyer's independent professional judgment
on all other issues that arise during litigation: how to conduct discovery, where to invest money on
experts, etc. Unlike the ability to settle, however, these issues are commonly solved by obtaining the
client's informed consent at the inception of representation.
41. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Abbott, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 24 (Ky. App. Feb. 4, 2011)
(representing one order regarding the settlement of some of the cases).
42. See United States v. Cunningham, 679 F.3d 355, 369-70 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting the
disbarment of William Gallion and Shirley Cunningham and affirming their convictions for
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, which resulted in jail time).
43. Cunningham v. Abbott, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 24 at *18.
44. Id. at *15. Of this amount, the attorneys "admitted paying themselves more than [$20
million] each, . . .millions to other lawyers[,] and dose to [$3 million] to non-lawyers." Id.
45. Jon Newberry, Former N. Ky. Judge Jay Bamberger Disbarred, BUSINESS COURIER (Oct. 27,
2011, 2:48 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/news/2011/10/27/former-n-ky-judge-jay-
bamberger.html?page=all. Further, the Kentucky lawyers were jailed and the judge resigned in order
to evade possible removal from office. Andrew Wolfson, A Breach of Duty; 3 Lawyers Kept Millions
from Drug's Victims, COURIER-JOURNAL (Jan. 20, 2007), http://www.courier-journal.com/
article/20070121/NEWSOI /701210383/A-breach-duty-3-lawyers-kept-millions-from-drug-s-victims.
46. Debra Cassens Weiss, Ken Feinberg's Affidavit Cited in Appeals Ruling Favoring Fen-Phen
Lawyers, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 18, 2011, 10:57 AM), http://www.abajournal.cominews/article/
kenfeinbergs.retracted.aflidavit cited in-appeals-nling-favoring-fen-phen/.
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A more recent and graphic example is the case of Johnson v. Nextel
Communications, Inc.," in which 587 individuals "hired [New York law
firm Leeds, Morelli & Brown, P.C. (LMB)] to pursue employment
discrimination claims against Nextel."' Instead of pursuing these claims,
LMB and Nextel entered into their own private side agreement, termed a
"Dispute Resolution and Settlement Agreement" (DRSA), which they
then made "the exclusive means of settlement for all claimants then
represented by LMB." 9
Under the DRSA, Nextel agreed to pay LMB "$2 million if it persuaded
the claimants to: (i) drop all pending lawsuits and administrative
complaints against Nextel within two weeks ... ; and (ii) sign within ten
weeks individual agreements in which each claimant agreed to be bound
by the DRSA."50 Upon resolution of the claims, Nextel agreed to pay
LMB another $7.5 million and LMB agreed to take no more Nextel
cases. 5 ' LMB then presented the claimants with agreements that set forth
the basic terms of the DRSA, which nearly all of them signed.5 2
The Johnson court held that the DRSA between LMB and Nextel
created "overriding and abiding conflicts of interest" for the lawyers and
vitiated the attorneys' ability to honor their clients' fiduciary duties in light
of the monetary incentives for LMB to convince its clients to waive
important rights.53  "It cannot be gainsaid that, viewed on its face alone,
the DRSA created an enormous conflict of interest between LMB and its
47. Johnson v. Nextel Commc'ns, Inc., 660 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2011).
48. Id. at 135.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The agreement also provided "that Nextel would retain LMB as a legal consultant ...
for ... two years following the resolution of all claims for an additional consultancy fee of
$83,333.35 per month ... bringing the total value of the DRSA to LMB to $7.5 million." Id at
136.
52. Id. The court described the agreement as follows:
In the Individual Agreement, the particular claimant had to state that he or she "reviewed the
[DRSA]; had the opportunity to discuss that Agreement with [LMB] or any other counsel of
[his or her] choosing; and agree to comply fully with the terms of that Agreement." With
respect to the payment of legal fees, the Individual Agreements stated only that "I acknowledge
and understand that ... Nextel has agreed to pay an amount of money to [LMB] to cover the
attorneys' fees and expenses, other than expert fees, that Claimants might otherwise pay to
[LMB . . . ."
Id. Further, the claimants in the appeal alleged "that, notwithstanding the statements in the
Individual Agreements and Pledges of Good Faith, LMB did not allow the claimants to review the
full DRSA, but rather provided only the signature page of the DRSA, the Individual Agreements, and
a document entitled 'Highlights of Settlement Agreement.'" Id.
53. Id at 139.
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clients."54
The court then reviewed the consents signed by the plaintiffs and stated
that, while many conflicts of interest may be waived, "there may be
circumstances in which a conflict is not consentable," 55 including the one
in this case, for two reasons:
First, because LMB was not lead counsel in a class action, the class-protective
provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 were not triggered. Therefore, LMB's clear
duty as counsel to the parties seeking relief from Nextel was to advise each
client individually as to what was in his or her best interests taking into
account all of the differing circumstances of each particular claim. 5 6
Second, the court stated, "[G]iven the conflicts described above, any advice
from LMB to its claimant clients could not possibly be independent advice
untainted by the counter-incentives of the DRSA such that the resulting
consent would be valid."5 7
In light of this law firm's outrageous behavior, perhaps the most
surprising feature of this opinion is that it reversed a trial court order that
had dismissed the plaintiffs' claims.5 1
It seems to have taken a while for mass tort litigators to appreciate the
difference between class action cases and individual representations, or
perhaps many have just ignored them to avoid the difficulties. As
Professor Nancy Moore recently wrote, "[M]ass tort lawyers often treat
their clients as if they were members of a class without affording them the
judicial protections given to actual class members."5 9  This is an
interesting comment because it suggests-in my view, correctly-that not
only are individual clients given short shrift in mass-plaintiff cases, but
they are actually at a disadvantage when compared to class action
members. Class action members are at least guaranteed disclosure in the
form of class notices, the ability to opt out of the class if they do not like
the settlement, and oversight from the courts.
54. Id.
55. Id
56. Id. at 140 (internal citations omitted). The court continued, "LMB was being paid by
Nextel in effect to ignore its duty to represent clients as individuals with differing claims and interests
that might require differing amounts of time and preparation vigorously to pursue a recovery." Id.
57. Id. at 141.
58. Id. at 142.
59. Nancy J. Moore, The Absence ofLegalEthics in the ALI's Principles of the Law of Aggregate
Litigation:A Missed Opportunity-and More, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 717, 728-29 (2011).
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B. Other Even More Frightening Examples
In the last decade, in my own litigation practice, which usually involves
ethics overtones, I have repeatedly witnessed mass-plaintiff cases in which
lawyers have engaged in behavior that is so horrendous and shocking that
their actions seem more far-fetched than the worst offenses in a John
Grisham novel. At best, these lawyers seem to have completely forgotten
that they represent individual clients.
There are many examples of this type of "toxic lawyering" in practice. I
focus here on two areas--engagement agreements and settlements. The
following are some examples of engagement agreements I have seen in
recent years.6 0
* A case in which the attorneys provided only a brief retention
agreement, which made no mention at all of conflicts of interest
despite the hundreds of plaintiffs involved.6
* An engagement agreement that stated the attorneys saw no reasonably
foreseeable conflicts of interest among their 600 individual clients
and continued with a simple statement that if a conflict arose the
clients waived it, without any explanation as to what kind of conflict
might occur. 62
* Several retainer agreements purporting to have clients both give up
the right to settle and give the lawyer the right to accept an aggregate
settlement without the client's involvement, ostensibly appointing
their lawyers as attorneys-in-fact, 63 despite specific rules giving the
clients the sole right to settle6 ' and preventing aggregate
settlements.6 5
* Attorneys using retainer agreements to claim a committee created by
the plaintiffs' lawyer will eventually determine clients' levels of
compensation after settlement, in clear contravention of the ethical
60. Each example below refers to documents and evidence from litigation. Due to secrecy
agreements to which I am an agent of a party, particularly as it relates to clients' settlements, I do not
name here the cases or the lawyers involved. However, all documents demonstrating the following
violations, some redacted, are on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal.
61. See Exhibit A, Retainer Agreement, at 1-2 (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal)
(providing a two-page retainer agreement with no mention of conflicts of interest).
62. See Exhibit B, Retainer Agreement at 1, Maxon v. Initiative Legal Group, No. CGC-12-
523966 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2012) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal) ("Client
acknowledges that at this time there is no conflict and no conflict is foreseen.... Client nevertheless
knowingly and voluntarily consents to [any potentially adverse representation].").
63. Exhibit A, Retainer Agreement, at 2 (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal); Exhibit D,
Letter to Client, at 1 (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal).
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012).
65. Id R. 1.8 (g).
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rules." 6 Under some such agreements, if a client objects, she can
appeal to an arbitrator selected by the lawyer, but if the client loses
the arbitration (at which she is not represented) she has to pay the
arbitrator's fees. 6 7
* Engagement agreements that purport to allow the lawyer to abandon
the client if the client does not agree to a settlement approved by a
super-majority of the clients. 6 8
I have seen the following abuses in settlement agreements or as required
conditions of settlement:
* Settlements forged by counsel's agreement with the defendants with
little or even no plaintiff participation, often without full disclosure
to plaintiffs and occasionally without advising the plaintiffs that a
settlement exists.6 9
* Settlements in which plaintiffs' lawyers advised their own clients that
the settlement agreements themselves were "confidential" so that the
clients could not see them until after signing incomplete ratifications
of the settlements, denying the clients the opportunity to examine
the settlement's actual terms.7 0
* Cases settled without entering into settlement agreements due to the
lack of client participation, notification, or consent. Sometimes the
defendant and plaintiffs' counsel make such settlements with the
understanding that a sufficient percentage of clients will ratify and
66. Exhibit A, Retainer Agreement, at 2 (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal); Exhibit D,
Letter to Client, at 2 (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal).
67. Exhibit F, Letter to Clients, at 2 (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal).
68. See Exhibit D, Letter to Client, at 2 (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal) ("If any of you
refuse, we will then represent you for the period of time it's necessary for you to obtain other
counsel."); Exhibit E, Letter to Client, at 1 (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal) ("Kindly get a
new lawyer."); see also Exhibit B, Retainer Agreement at 1, Maxon v. Initiative Legal Group, No.
CGC-12-523966 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2012) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal)
("Attorneys may withdraw at any time and for any reason . . . ."). Such abandonment not only
evinces a conflict, but also violates Rule 1.16, regarding what a lawyer must do before withdrawing
from a case. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c)-(d) (2012) (stating "[a] lawyer
must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a
representation" and "[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests").
69. Complaint at 5:24-6:13, Maxon v. Initiative Legal Group, No. CGC-12-523966 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2012) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal). This goes at least a
step or two beyond the conduct evidenced in the Nextel/LMB case. See Johnson v. Nextel
Commc'ns, Inc., 660 F.3d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 2011) (setting forth the terms of the DRSA); Exhibit I,
Ratification of Settlement Agreement, at 1 (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal) (forging
settlement without meaningful client participation).
70. Exhibit I, Ratification of Settlement Agreement, at 2 (on file with the St. Mary's Law
Journal).
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acknowledge the settlement after the fact, once the clients are
advised of the settlement, even if that advisement comes months
after the deal has been forged.
* More extreme, plaintiffs' counsel drafted settlement agreements for
their clients' cases that had the defendant and the plaintiffi'lawyers as
parties.7 2
* Most extreme, settlement agreements-again, not shown to the
plaintiffs, but merely ratified after the fact-that state if a sufficient
percentage of plaintiffs ratify, plaintiffs' counsel agrees to defend the
defendants against the non-settling plaintiffs, in essence the attorneys'
agreement to switch sides and become adverse to their own clients.7 3
Not every lawyer engages in these subterfuges, which at their worst are
fraudulent and even criminal. However, these examples are not isolated
occurrences and, of course, there are less onerous ethical violations.
It seems that some lawyers in mass-plaintiff litigation believe that their
ability to act entirely within the bounds of the current ethics rules is so
beyond complying "with great difficulty" that it has become impossible.
This is hardly an excuse for unethical behavior, but there is a disconnect,
even for the most ethical lawyers, between strictly adhering to the current
rules and managing a case with huge numbers of plaintiffs.
VI. A PROBLEM IN NEED OF A SOLUTION
No ethical lawyer would think the methods of toxic lawyering described
above solve anything. Such actions only make things profitable for the
lawyers who lie to or cheat their clients. A solution is necessary to bridge
the gulf between the current inflexible rules and the reality of practice.
However, there is no magic bullet here. The reality is that mass torts
71. See Complaint at 5:24-10:20, Maxon v. Initiative Legal Group, No. CGC-12-523966
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2012) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal) (setting forth a
copy of the "Confidential Release and Acknowledgement"); Exhibit J, Correspondence, at 2 (on file
with the St. Mary's Law Journal) (claiming the purported release and acknowledgement "is the
settlement agreement," a position later abandoned); Exhibit K, Release, at 1 (on file with the St.
Mary's Law Journal) (demonstrating a release and acknowledgement).
72. See Exhibit M, Settlement Agreement, at 1-2 (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal)
(stating the defendants pay the plaintiffs' law firm directly in return for dismissals of the firm's
clients' cases); see also Complaint at 7:4-8:25, Maxon v. Initiative Legal Group, No. CGC-12-
523966 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2012) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal)
("naming the Attorney Defendants as the settling party" (emphasis omitted)).
73. Exhibit L, Settlement Agreement and Release, at 25 (on file with the St. Mary's Law
journal).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 679 F.3d 355, 369-70 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming
two attorneys' convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud).
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and other large multi-plaintiff cases are here to stay. They are necessary
when class actions are not available7 5 and allow more injured persons to
receive suitable representation in complex litigation.7 6  Yet, mass-plaintiff
cases may be subject to little, if any, court scrutiny,7 7 despite the fact that
these cases present daunting fiduciary duty problems, including loyalty,
candid communication, confidentiality, and competence.
While several authorities have suggested solutions from both plaintiffs'
and defense counsels' perspectives, they hardly seem adequate. One
solution would allow an attorney to get clients' prior authorization to a
minimum settlement amount or even a minimum aggregate amount.78
Another would permit "damages averaging," or allowing a settlement that
minimizes differences between the strongest and weakest claims in order to
accommodate the vast majority of plaintiffs satisfactorily.7 9  Others
suggest-and many lawyers actually use-matrixes based on objective
standards such as the degree of harm, proximity to harm, causation, and
damages of each client; based on the clients' individual cases, they are
placed into a matrix group that gets a particular settlement level.so Others
combine the above methods with administration, placement, and
distribution of all matrix claims by an independent third-party special
master or claims supervisor. 8 ' Finally, another solution is to allow
75. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (defining the prerequisites required before cases may be "fit" into the
types of class actions provided); Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Failure to
meet any of the Rule's requirements precludes class certification.").
76. Because mass tort litigation often involves sophisticated scientific issues, many victims are
unable to find adequate representation. See Mass Tort Litigation, HERMES SARGENT BATES, L.L.P.,
http://www.hsblaw.com/legalexp/masstortdit.php (last visited Feb. 6, 2013) (noting the "complex and
demanding" area of mass tort litigation); cf FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (setting forth what a court will
consider before appointing class counsel).
77. Unless mass-plaintiff cases receive MDL treatment, they will generally not require
significant judicial oversight. Because mass-plaintiff cases often involve only one or two law firms,
those cases rarely involve MDL litigation, and thus do not receive significant judicial oversight. In re
World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, 834 F. Supp. 2d 184, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), is a notable
exception.
78. Barry Hill, Ethics in Mass Tort Settlements, ANAPOL SCHWARTZ, at 23-24 (2009),
http://www.hwlaw.us/pdf/Hill%20Ethics%20in%2OMass%2OTorts.pdf.
79. See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 854-57 (2002) (positing that a rule compensating an average is
preferable for risk-averse individuals).
80. See Charles McCoy et al., Ethical Issues Raised in Bulk Settlement Agreements in Mass Torts,
RMKB, at 17, http://www.rmkb.com/tasks/sites/rmkb/assets/image/324.pdf (last visited Feb. 6,
2013) (suggesting "a settlement matrix or grid" because these systems are objective). Many lawyers in
the examples above use this methodology, which purports to vitiate client control and autonomy.
Exhibit A, Retainer Agreement, at 2 (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal); Exhibit D, Letter to
Client, at 1 (on file with the St. Mary's LawJournal).
81. See Barry Hill, Ethics in Mass Tort Settlements, ANAPOL SCHWARTZ, at 25 (2009),
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individual plaintiffs who do not agree simply to opt out of participation,
often, however, without ongoing representation.8 2
None of these solutions quite does the job. Defendants like minimum
aggregate sums, but for plaintiffs' counsel, that is like giving away the
bottom line. Plaintiffs are most comfortable with being able to opt out of
a settlement that does not get them what they want, but defendants do not
like the possibility of a settlement that does not cover all of the plaintiffs.
Further, none of these rules square entirely with Model Rule 1.8 (g) as it
now stands, a rule that was simply not developed with mass-plaintiffs' cases
in mind.8 3
In 2010, the American Law Institute took a different approach from
Model Rule 1 .8(g) by promulgating a guide for attorneys, titled Principles
of the Law ofAggregate Litigation." Among those principles, section 3.17
provides:
(a) A lawyer or group of lawyers who represent two or more claimants on a
non-class basis may settle the claims of those claimants on an aggregate basis
provided that each claimant gives informed consent in writing....
(b) In lieu of the requirements set forth in subsection (a), individual
claimants may, before the receipt of a proposed settlement offer, enter into
an agreement in writing through shared counsel allowing each participating
claimant to be bound by a substantial-majority vote of all claimants
concerning an aggregate-settlement proposal . .. . An agreement under this
subsection must meet each of the following requirements:
(1) The power to approve a settlement offer must at all times rest with
the claimants collectively and may under no circumstances be assigned to
claimants' counsel. Claimants may exercise their collective decision making
power to approve a settlement through the selection of an independent agent
other than counsel.
http://www.hwlaw.us/pdf/Hill%20Ethics%20in%2OMass%2OTorts.pdf (discussing a lump sum
settlement "with claim matrix and third party administrator").
82. See Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. REV.
979, 1023-25 (2010) (analyzing the possible results of "most-or-nothing" settlements where
plaintiffs are allowed to opt out). In the cases I have witnessed, clients who refuse to play ball with
the settlement often find themselves abandoned by their lawyers.
83. See Katherine Dirks, Note, Ethical Rules of Conduct in the Settlement of Mass Torts: A
Proposal to Revise Rule 1.8(g), 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 501, 512-13 (2008) ("The Rule is a simple set of
guidelines for attorney-client relations, but the attorney-client relationship varies greatly depending
on the structure of the representation.").
84. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LmGATION § 3.17 (2010).
These principles are not part of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, which is also
promulgated by the ALI, and they are not generally considered to rise to the level of a formal
'restatement." See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS %§ 16,
18, 19 (2000). Nevertheless, they are approved ALI principles.
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(2) The agreement among the claimants may occur at the time the
lawyer-client relationship is formed or thereafter, but only if all participating
claimants give informed consent....
(3) The agreement must specify the procedures by which all
participating claimants are to approve a settlement offer....
(4) Before claimants enter into the agreement, their lawyer or group of
lawyers must explain to all claimants that the mechanism under subsection
(a) is available as an alternative means of settling an aggregate lawsuit under
this Section ... 85
Unfortunately, the four requirements the ALI sets forth are somewhat
diluted by the very language of the Principles themselves. In reality, the
power to settle "remains with the collective claimants" only if they do not
hire a third party, supposedly "independent" agent." Such an agent
would violate Model Rule 1.8(g) as currently drafted because each client is
not giving his or her informed consent.8 7 More importantly, however, the
Principles do not seem to vest power in the plaintiffs as claimed; rather,
they vitiate plaintiffs' power and hand it to someone else. That so-called
independent agent may be no more independent than the neutral
arbitrator picked by the lawyer under one of the engagement agreements
described above.
Moreover, the required informed consent is diluted. The comments to
the section state "[t]he amount of information required for informed
consent depends on the facts of the case," which is hardly a clear
standard." Further, disclosure of alternatives in representation-whether
to be bound by the substantial-majority vote or not-is something the ALI
says can be undertaken at any time prior to settlement." But if it is not
part of the retainer agreement ab initio, can it ever be fair to all clients
when they are asked to consent after-the-fact? Finally, the proposal "does
not prevent counsel from refusing to represent claimants who choose
representation [without being bound by the substantial-majority vote]." 9 0
That is, those plaintiffs are likely to be abandoned by their lawyers and left
without representation.
85. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.17 (2010).
86. See id. § 3.17(b)(1) (providing for "the selection of an independent agent other than
counsel").
87. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2012).
88. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.17 cmt. b
(2010). But cf id. § 3.17 cmt. c ("Subsection (c) does not define 'substantial majority' but leaves that
issue to legislative drafting.").
89. Id. 3.17(b)(4).
90. Id. 3.17 cmt. b.
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In short, as Professor Moore has noted:
[The Principles] offer a view of mass representation that is unduly rosy. They
not only ignore the application of ethics rules to various aspects of nonclass
aggregations, but also affirmatively downplay the risks of such representation
and the role that ethics rules play in protecting the individual clients against
such risks. 1
Are there solutions, then, that are more workable? Some commentators,
including Professor Moore, recommend full disclosure.92 But, as noted
above, even full disclosure may not be enough unless it is accompanied by
advice tailored to the needs of each individual client-a real obstacle
considering the inherent conflicts among the circumstances of various
clients.
Others, including United States District Judges Jack B. Weinstein"
and Alvin K. Hellerstein," argue forcefully that such cases require judicial
oversight.
Over the years, Judge Hellerstein issued a number of orders, opinions,
and decisions in the World Trade Center cases. 9' The judge recognized
early on that a case with over 9,000 individual, disparate plaintiffs would
have "numerous potential conflicts among them and between them and
their law firm."9 7  He appointed an independent ethics counsel, Hofstra
91. Nancy J. Moore, The Absence of Legal Ethics in the ALI's Principles of the Law of Aggregate
Litigation: A Missed Opportuni and More, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 717, 728 (2011).
92. See id. at 730 (noting without full disclosure, "[b]y the time that an aggregate settlement is
proposed, it may be too late for individual clients to protect themselves against the risks of
aggregation").
93. See id. at 730 n.78 (recognizing that full disclosure may not fully benefit clients if the
attorney has continuing conflicts of interests among multiple clients).
94. United States District Judge Jack B. Weinstein, of the Eastern District of New York,
pioneered supervision of mass tort cases, from the Agent Orange case, In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), to the Zyprexa case in the new millennium, In re
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). In 1994 he expressed his belief
that lawyers have an obligation to act in the public interest in such cases. Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical
Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469, 490 (1994). Judge Weinstein wrote:
It is my impression that few of the groups of plaintiffs I have dealt with in Agent Orange,
asbestos, or DES were helped systematically or sympathetically as communities by lawyers
handling their cases. Most lawyers were focused on getting cash for the individual client,
obtaining a large fee, and closing the file.
Id.
95. Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein is the United States District Judge for the Southern District of
New York and has been most notably involved in the World Trade Center cases. In re World Trade
Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
96. In re World Trade Cit. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
97. Id at 190.
106 [Vol. 3:86
20131 Regulating the Behavior ofLauyers in Mass Individual Representations
law professor Roy Simon, an expert on legal ethics, to oversee the
plaintiffs' lawyers. 9 When in 2010 the lawyers proposed dismissing some
non-responding plaintiffs "with prejudice" (meaning that their cases could
never be re-filed), he hired an "Independent Special Counsel" to try to
contact those plaintiffs and ascertain their wishes.99
In a 2011 order, Judge Hellerstein wrote that this case "fit[] neither
paradigm-individual or class," but that it had many similarities with class
actions.'oo These included "a mass settlement in an aggregate amount,"
"the settlement amount subject to subdivision among sub-classes," a
settlement "negotiated and executed not with Plaintiffs . . . but with the
law firm representing the large majority of the Plaintiffs," and plaintiffs
who did not "have choice about terms, conditions, or amounts." 10
Further, the judge noted, "Their assent was to be manifested, as in class
settlements, by an after-the-fact ratification ... ."102
The judge also considered the "compelling" conflict between the
principal plaintiffs' law firm and the plaintiffs:
[S]ince a normal attorney-client relationship cannot function where one
lawyer represents so many clients, each with varying and diverse interests,
judicial review must exist to assure fairness and to prevent overreaching....
Faced with difficult and complicated choices, the Plaintiffs needed
unconflicted attorneys with whom to consult and be advised.'
The judge did not dispute that plaintiffs' counsel attempted to provide
the plaintiffs with such independent consultation and advice; however, the
judge noted that the law firm itself had an interest in settling after years of
litigation.1 0 4 The judge specifically noted that the law firm had
"borrowed heavily, and incurred a large interest expense" and had "the
prospect of settlement and a fee of $250 million." 0 5
Thus, Judge Hellerstein concluded, "For the same reasons requiring a
judge to review and approve class settlements for fairness, a district judge
must review a mass tort settlement such as that now before me." 0 6
9 8. Id.
99. Id. at 192.
100. Id. at 196.
101. Id.
10 2. Id.
103. Id. at 196-97.
104. See id. at 197-98 ("[Plaintiffs' counsel] itself had a compelling interest to settle, [having]
carried on eight years of strenuous litigation and two appeals without any compensation.").
105. Id. at 198. "The prospect of settlement and a fee of $250 million gave the firm an interest
that may not have been in line with many of its clients' interests." Id
106. Id at 196 (citing In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458 (E.D.N.Y.
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Judicial oversight might work reasonably well in these circumstances,
but there are major unsolved questions. First, strong jurists like Judge
Weinstein and Judge Hellerstein might have the public interest-and the
interests and overall wellbeing of the plaintiffs-in mind, but they seem a
bit too ready to discard some of the rights that plaintiffs have long held.
These rights include, to re-quote Judge Hellerstein, not giving plaintiffs a
"choice about terms, conditions, or amounts" of settlement except "by an
after-the-fact ratification." 1 0
7
Thus, in both the Zyprexa and 9/11 cases, the judges saw fit to choose
the greater good over the rights of individual plaintiffs. But on what basis?
Judge Hellerstein cited no rule, law, or ethical precept to justify taking
away these plaintiffs' choices about terms, conditions, and amounts. Both
Judge Weinstein in Zyprexa and Judge Hellerstein in the 9/11 cases have
referred to such cases as "quasi-class actions."'o Is there such a thing?' 09
Do they not remain individual plaintiffs, whether swept up into mass tort
cases or not?
When a knowledgeable and sophisticated judge experienced in multi-
district litigation is involved, and the judge is well intentioned and public-
spirited, judicial oversight certainly helps curb some of the worst abuses
described above. But is judicial oversight enough in other circumstances?
What happens to the 500 plaintiffs in a state court case when the court
does not have a coordinating MDL mechanism or the judge does not have
particular mass tort case experience?
2006)).
The parties to a lawsuit, if all are involved, may dismiss or settle their own lawsuit; in general, a
judge does not have to be involved. In a class action, in contrast, a dismissal or settlement is not
effective unless, after hearing the parties and any appearing members of the class who object, a
judge finds settlement fair and reasonable, in the interests of the settling class.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
107. Id
108. Id. at 196 (citing In re Zyprexa, 451 F. Supp. 2d 458). Judge Hellerstein further stated
that litigation involving one law firm or a small group of law firms representing a large group of
plaintiffs, "although fitting neither paradigm-individual or class-substantially resembles a class
action." Id.
109. Whether judges should be allowed this "quasi-class action" vehicle remains in dispute.
See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389, 389-
90 (2011) (arguing "there is no such thing as a quasi-class action" and that the term is a
"jurisprudential oxymoron that its proponents deploy to justify the expeditious resolution of
aggregate claims, while failing to adequately protect the interests of claimants"). Professor Moore has
noted that passive class action members may have more protections than individual clients may in
mass-plaintiff cases. Nancy J. Moore, The Absence ofLegal Ethics in the ALI's Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation: A Missed Opportuni and More, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 717, 728-29
(2011).
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Finally, judicially supervised cases are only one part of the equation.
Many of the abuses I witnessed and described above involved one law firm
or a small group of law firms representing all plaintiffs. They are very
different from the typical multi-district litigation, such as the Zyprexa case,
in which dozens of law firms are involved, complete with lead counsel and
steering committees, making that case look administratively much more
like a class action crying out for judicial supervision and approval. But in a
mass-plaintiff case handled by a single law firm, it would be difficult for a
judge to have even the opportunity to assert judicial supervision,
particularly when it comes to the potential red flag issues of fee agreement
abuses and communications between lawyers and clients about
settlement. 10
Ultimately, the beginning of a solution may rest with the extent of
disclosure. While courts, ethics opinions, and commentators have noted
that full disclosure should include all the elements of the settlement for the
individual plaintiff in question and the group of plaintiffs generally,"'
there can be, and perhaps should be, disclosure beyond this. Professor
Moore suggests this, asking, "[W]hat ensures that the clients have been
adequately informed of both the advantages and the risks of proceeding as
part of a 'litigation group'? What ensures that the decisions are truly
consensual?"1 2 She then answers her own question:
Under rules of professional conduct, individual clients must be fully
informed, at the outset of the representation, of any significant risk that the
representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's duty to other
clients. With that information, individual clients might decide that they
want to become part of a litigation group represented by this particular
lawyer. But some clients might refuse, or they might decide that they prefer
to be represented by a lawyer who represents a more narrowly tailored
110. Compare id. (analyzing the voluntary or involuntary dismissal of plaintiffs, as a result of
one firm handling a massive case with over 9,000 plaintiffs), with In re Zyprexa, 451 F. Supp. 2d at
462 (citing a mass tort, multi-district prescription drug litigation and the settlement agreement
stipulations). The 9/11 litigation under Judge Hellerstein's supervision is a notable exception because
one law firm is the principal plaintiffs' firm. But the unique circumstances under which that case has
operated, and its unique and tragic underlying facts, set it apart from more typical one-law-firm cases.
The cases I have described under Part V(B), above, are all essentially single law firm cases.
111. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2012) (requiring disdosure of "all
the claims or pleas involved"); see also AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE
LITIGATION § 3.17(a) (2010) ("Informed consent requires that each claimant be able to review the
settlements of all other persons subject to the aggregate settlement or the formula by which the
settlement will be divided among all claimants.").
112. Nancy J. Moore, The Absence of Legal Ethics in the ALIs Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation: A Missed Opportunity-and More, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 717, 731 (2011).
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group ... .113
I suggest taking this disclosure one step further. If prospective clients
are informed at the outset of representation that if they join the litigation
group their lawyers may make certain decisions that will be in the interests
of the overall group of plaintiffs-and not necessarily in the best interests
of that individual-such disclosure would be not only closer to the truth,
but also closer to what should be acceptable. Further still, if the disclosure
stated, for example, that their lawyers could recommend settlement if a
broad consensus of plaintiffs-80% or more-agree, this disclosure should
be sufficient to allow the prospective plaintiffs to give informed consent at
case commencement. Moreover, disclosure is more likely to be
"consentable" if the plaintiffs are ensured that, regardless of whether they
join in the eventual settlement, their lawyers will continue to represent
them to the best of their abilities.
Would such a disclosure comport with Model Rule 1.8(g)? Probably
not. If the disclosure allowed for a carefully thought out decision-making
process involving 80% or more of plaintiffs, this still would not pass
muster under the current rule. 1  I believe it makes the most sense to
revise this rule slightly-not to broadly allow aggregate settlements
determined by lawyers with big loyalty conflicts and huge fees at stake, but
to narrowly allow fully informed clients to knowingly and intelligently
abrogate a degree of their settlement autonomy in the interests of
becoming represented plaintiffs in a mass-plaintiff case.
This is far from a perfect solution. I suspect that lawyers and their
denizens will still try to control the settlement process. Attorneys will
select teams of lead plaintiffs to publicize the party line to the masses of
"mere" plaintiffs, and clients will still be strong-armed, or at least gently
prodded, into settlements being pushed by their attorneys.
However, two things will have changed. First, the gross horror stories
that now routinely occur in mass tort cases would likely end. If plaintiffs'
lawyers have an ethical way of achieving results for their many clients,
regardless of the objections of the few, most will take that road. Second,
rules-makers will be able to narrow the focus of what needs to be fixed,
trying to ensure that limited aggregate settlements truly reflect and protect
the needs of all plaintiffs. Rules-makers can start by guaranteeing that
those plaintiffs with outlying cases be fully informed before the inception
113. Id. (citation omitted).
114. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.8(g) (2012) (prohibiting aggregate
settlements without the express consent of all parties).
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of representation. Taking that a step further, a system can be developed to
allow those plaintiffs to effectively opt out of a super-majority settlement,
which happens today when defendants take their chances by buying peace
with 85% or 90% of plaintiffs and take on the risk of the remaining 10%
or 15%.
As mass torts become part of the litigation firmament recognized under
particularized ethics rules, further rounds of nuanced changes can ensure
that, over time, the rights of individual plaintiffs are protected and the
overreaching of their lawyers is minimized.
VII. CONCLUSION
The perspective taken here is grounded in legal ethics and the
overarching principle that individual clients, whether in pairs, small
groups, or in large numbers, remain entitled to have their lawyers provide
the same fiduciary duties that single individual clients receive. This
perspective leads to the inescapable conclusion that all individual plaintiffs
have the right to be treated fairly, fully, and loyally by their counsel.
This concept creates inherent dissonance with the manner and the
means of handling high-multi-plaintiff cases. The ethical rules may have
to bend to end this dissonance, but they should only bend to the extent
that individual client autonomy and decision-making is preserved. The
rights individual clients may waive, even if they include a limited waiver or
consent to the right to settle, do not include a waiver of their lawyers'
duties of loyalty, candid disclosure, and independent professional
judgment and advice.
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